Differential Effects Rail Deregulation in the U.S. Grain Industry by Vachal, Kimberly et al.
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS RAIL DEREGULATION 






Kimberly Vachal, Advanced Research Fellow, Upper Great Plains Transportation 
Institute, North Dakota State University*; John Bitzan, Assistant Professor, 
Department of Management, Marketing and Finance, North Dakota State 
University; Tamara VanWechel, Associate Research Fellow, Upper Great Plains 
Transportation Institute, North Dakota State University; Dan Vinje, Researcher, 





Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the International 
Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, 





*Corresponding author: Kimberly Vachal, Upper Great Plains Transportation 
Institute, North Dakota State University, PO Box 5074, Fargo, North Dakota, 
58105, USA, Telephone: (701)231-6425, Kimberly.Vachal@ndsu.edu. 
 
 
Copyright 2006 by Kimberly Vachal, John Bitzan, Tamara VanWechel, and Dan 
Vinje. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document 
for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice 





  The efficiency benefits of U.S. rail industry deregulation are well documented in previous 
studies of rail productivity and declining rail rates.  This research provides new insight regarding 
the accrual of these benefits within the grain industry.  A disaggregate study of corn, wheat, and 
soybean rates across nine producing regions, shows that in recent years the railroads ability to 
differentiate markets based on competitive environment has shifted relatively more of the benefit 
to regions with the most competitive market environments.  Regions with less competitive 
pressure will continue to be relatively more disadvantaged in the rates that are an important 









Railroad deregulation in the United States has been successful in a macroeconomic context.  
Studies have shown that increased productivity, decreased rates, and increased profitability in the 
rail industry can be attributed to deregulation (Barnekov and Kleit, 1990; Wilson, 1992; Burton, 
1993; Dennis 2000).  While evidence suggests that benefits have been shared by shippers, in 
terms such as rail viability, rate savings, and service, the degree to which these benefits have 
accrued equitably across shippers and industries has been given sparing consideration.  Given the 
increasing level of competition associated with globalized markets, it may be especially important 
to understand these differentials, or unintended consequences, in projecting the effects of future 
investments and policies.  The following research investigates how incremental market 
adjustments, resulting from changes in institutional parameters, can affect relative product 





A time-series cross sectional analysis of grain rail rates is estimated using the Surface  
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Transportation Board Annual Rail Waybill Sample, Master File for the period 1981-2000.
1,2   The 
following mathematical representation of rail rates defines the model used in the regression 
analysis performed for this research.  The single dependent variable included in all analysis is 
revenue per ton-mile (also referred to as Arate@). The base model is: 
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where, 
RPTM   =  revenue per ton-mile 
CARS  =   number of railcars in the shipment 
SHRT  =    length of haul, in short-line miles 
LOAD  =   load weight per railcar 
HERF  =   rail market concentration index   
BDIS  =   distance from nearest barge loading facility  
GPROD  =  total U.S. grain production 
TRANS  =  transit shipment, identifier for length of haul under 50 miles 
TBDIST  =  time and barge distance interaction term 
THERF  =  time and rail market concentration interaction term 
TIME  =   time trend, year of shipment  
                                                   
1Formally known as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
2Initial attempts were made to extend the scope of the study by including the Annual Rail Waybill Sample, Master 
File from 1972 through 2000.  After considering cautionary remarks from the Surface Transportation Board and conducting 
a review of this data, it was determined that the reliability was not satisfactory in years prior to 1981. 
TIMESQ  =  squared time trend 
NE  =  Northeast Region (Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,  
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Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia) 
SE  =  Southeast Region (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee) 
DE  =  Delta Region (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi) 
NP  =  Northern Plains Region (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Wyoming) 
CP  =  Central Plains Region (Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska) 
SP  =  Southern Plain Region (New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) 
WCB  =  Western Corn Belt Region (Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri) 
PNW  =  Pacific Northwest Region (Idaho, Oregon, Washington)   
W  =  West Region (California, Nevada, Utah)     
MULTI  =  multi-car train shipment, includes 24 to 49 cars 
UNIT  =  unit train shipment, includes 50 to 109 cars 
SHUTTLE  =  shuttle train shipment, includes 110 cars or more 
CORN  =  commodity identifier for corn shipment 
SYBN  =  commodity identifier for soybean shipment 
Q2  =  cyclical indicator, 2
nd quarter shipment period (April through June) 
Q3  =  cyclical indicator, 3
rd quarter shipment period (July through 
September) 
Q4  =  cyclical indicator, 4
th quarter shipment period (October through 
December) 
TSQCORN  =  time-squared interaction term for corn shipment 
TSQSYBN  =  time-squared interaction term for soybean shipment 
T#####  =  time interaction term for associated variable A######@, including 
region and commodity   
㯀  =  Regional Effects Error Term 
㬰  =  Time Effects Error Term 
㭐  =  Normal Effects Error Term 
 
The operating and supply characteristics included in the model are shipment train size 
(CARS), shipment distance (SHRT), and carload density (LOAD).  These factors are indicative of 
railroad efficiency and productivity gains over time.  Measures of intra- and intermodal 
competition are considered as the influential factors in the relative elasticity of grain rail service 
demand.  Representation of modal competition includes distance barge facility (BDIST) and local 
rail competition (HERF) as inter- and intramodal measures, respectively.  The spatial and time 
influences on demand elasticity are considered in several terms in the models.  Underlying spatial  
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variability in demand elasticity is accounted for by including regional groupings of rail origins.  
The regional definition used by USDA Transportation and Marketing defines nine regions, 
including Central Plains, Delta, Eastern Corn Belt, Northeast, Northern Plains, Pacific Northwest, 
Southeast, Southern Plains, West, and Western Corn Belt.  The regions are based on similarities 
in agricultural production characteristics.  The regions have been used in previous analysis and 
are useful in commodity- and geographic-based discussions of market phenomena.  The 
underlying time trend is established by TIME, in the year-to-year trend for rail revenue per ton-
mile.  To better fit the decreasing rate of rate saving in more recent years, the squared time 
variable (TSQUARE) is included in the model.  TIME is expected to be inversely related to 
revenue per ton-mile, as the rail industry has had greater pricing flexibility in the deregulated 
environment.   
Interaction of time and selected variables allows delineation of differences in change or 
rates of change across competitive factors, space, and time.  Several interaction terms were 
included to allow an assessment of the differing impacts of deregulation as a result of differing 
levels of transportation competition over time.  The first two interaction terms, THERF and 
TBDIST, are indicators of a change in the effects of intramodal and intermodal influences on rail 
rates over time, respectively.  THERF is expected to have a positive relationship with rail rates.  It 
is posited that the industry has shifted from the former cost-based regulated structures to market-
based differential pricing in a deregulated environment.  With market-based pricing, captivity of 
shippers becomes more important.  Therefore, over time regions with lesser degrees of rail 
competition (more captive) will accrue relatively less of the benefits associated with intraindustry 
competition.  
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Regional- and commodity-based time interaction terms are also included to allow for 
variations in change of rates over time across regions.  Nine region/time interactions terms are 
included as T####, with A####@ referring to regional definition established with the USDA 
production region variables.  TCORN, TSYBN,  TSQCORN, and TSQSYBN, are 
commodity/time interaction terms with the first two variables measuring the effects of 
commodity differences over time, considering the commodity, and the latter two allowing for a 
change in the effects of time, considering the commodity, during the two decade time span of the 
study.  The time and time-squared interaction terms may be influenced by factors such as the 
initial rate, competition levels, and production geography.  These interaction terms are discussed 
in terms of expected signs but do provide important insight in discussing implications for 
producers of a specific commodity and producers located in a specific region. 
An industry demand variable is also included to account for year-to-year variability in the 
market demand for rail grain transportation.  The demand control variable is a measure of U.S. 
grain production (GPROD).  It is defined as the total annual production of seven major 
agricultural commodities, including wheat, barley, corn, oats, sorghum, rye, and soybeans 
(National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002).  It is expected that the relationship between 
revenue per ton-mile and total grain production will be positive and inelastic, signifying that as 
the demand for rail shipment increases, rail rates will increase.  Rail rates will increase as the 
demand for rail cars increases as determined by an increase in total grain production in the United 
States. 
To measure the seasonal affects of rail rates since deregulation, three quarterly dummy 
variables indicate the shipment time period.  Q2, Q3, and Q4 refer to the second, third, and forth  
  6
monthly quarters of the year.  The variation is for seasons measured in comparison to the first 
quarter of the year, as it is the quarter not included in the model.  The forth quarter is expected to 
be positive, indicating that harvest-time and post-harvest shipment volumes put upward pressure 
on rail service prices.  The signs for quarters 2 and 3 are expected to be negative, as there are 
relatively lower demand levels for rail grain shipments in these quarters considering a quarter-
based cycle of annual grain shipments. 
Three additional dummy variables are included to delineate rail rate categories.  Rail rates 
are published by the railroads as a single price per car from a train that ranges between a 
minimum and maximum number of cars.  These tariff ranges are generally defined as single car, 
multiple car (MULTI), unit train (UNIT), and shuttle (SHUTTLE) train shipments.  The strict 
definition of these ranges varies by railroad and commodity.  For the purposes of this research, 
single car rates apply to rail shipments including 1 to 24 cars and multiple car shipments include 
25 to 49.  These shipments are generally bound for domestic origins, including processors and 
feedlots.  The unit and shuttle shipments, which provide the greatest potential for rail and shipper 
economies of scale, are generally bound for export destinations.  The MULTI, UNIT, and 
SHUTTLE control variables are included to adjust the intercept for shifts between rate ranges in 
the rail tariff.  The variables may also be used in a general discussion of the rates for shipments 
destined for the domestic and export markets. 
The error terms complete the definition of the empirical model.  There are three error 
components in the model to account for the effects of error associated with normal variation, 








The result of the log-linear estimation of rail revenue per ton-mile between 1981 and 2000 
for corn, soybeans, and wheat is presented in Table 1.  Variables included in the model explain 
approximately 74 percent of the variation in revenue per ton-mile.  The model is satisfactory, as 
most explanatory variables have their expected signs and most are significant at conventional 
levels.   
In examining the parameter estimates for variables expected to influence movement costs, 
all have their expected signs and are significant at the one percent level.  To the extent that 
demand side variables are accounted for in the estimation, parameter estimates on movement 
characteristics should reflect the influence of such characteristics on costs.  The number of rail 
cars in a shipment and the commodity weight per car have a negative influence on rate per ton-
mile, since unit costs per ton decrease with increased train weight.  Similarly, multi-car, unit-train, 
and shuttle-train dummy variables all have negative influences on rate per ton-mile due to 
declines in unit costs with increased weight and due to increases in loading and switching 
efficiency with these larger train sizes.  Short-line miles have a negative influence on rate per ton-
mile due to the spreading of fixed terminal costs over longer distances. 
Variables influencing the elasticity of demand for a particular rail shipment include the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of railroad competition, the distance of the shipment origin from the  
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nearest water loading facility, and commodity/regional dummy variables.  As expected, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the distance of the shipment origin from the nearest water 
loading facility both have a positive influence on rate per ton-mile, suggesting a decrease in the 
elasticity of demand for a particular railroad shipment with less intramodal and intermodal 
competitive alternatives (Figure 2).  Average distance of origin rail points from the nearest barge 
loading facility, weighted by regional volumes, are longest for wheat at 232 miles.  The average 
distances of origin points from the nearest barge loading facilities are 91 and 92 miles for corn 
and soybeans, respectively. 
Commodity dummy variables for corn and soybeans both have negative and statistically 
significant parameter estimates, suggesting lower rates for the movement of such products in 
comparison to wheat.  These commodity dummy variables largely reflect differences in 
geographic and product competition among different commodities.  Commodities with more 
substitutes and that are produced in many regions are likely to realize lower railroad rates.  Since 
corn and soybeans have many substitutes in the feed grain market, with wide spread U.S. 
production, their negative signs relative to wheat are expected. 
Similarly, regional dummy variables reflect differences in geographic and product 
competition among regions.  Regions whose primary grains are also produced in adequate supply 
elsewhere are more likely to receive favorable rates for their shipments.  In this model, all regional 
dummies are interpreted in relation to the Eastern Corn Belt Region (the region left for the 
estimation).  After controlling for shipment characteristics and other competitive conditions, 
several regions, such as the Northern Plains, Central Plains, Southern Plains, Western Corn Belt,  
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and West, experienced higher rates than the Eastern Corn Belt (at least initially).
3  Other regions, 
such as the North East and the South East, experienced lower rates. 
 



















Intercept      2.3301*  -0.0843  South East Dummy  -0.1019*  -0.0061 
Number of Rail Cars  -0.0258*  -0.0012  Delta Dummy  0.0696*  -0.0137 
Short-Line Miles  -0.5120*  -0.0011  Northern Plains Dummy  0.2871*  -0.0064 
Commodity Weight per Car  -0.5173*  -0.0035  Central Plains Dummy  0.2569*  -0.0049 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  0.0788*  -0.0035  Southern Plains Dummy  0.2540*  -0.0059 
Distance from Barge Facil.  0.0212*  -0.0015  Western Corn Belt Dummy  0.1600*  -0.0044 
Annual Grain Production  0.0124**  -0.0051  Pacific Northwest Dummy  0.0137***  -0.008 
Time  -0.0956*  -0.0011  West Dummy  0.1147*  -0.0116 
Time
2  0.0035*  -0.00005  Time*North East Dummy  -0.0164*  -0.0012 
Time*Dist from Barge Facil.  0.0018*  -0.0002  Time*South East Dummy  0.0130*  -0.0007 
Time*Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Index 
-0.0031*  -0.0004  Time*Delta Dummy  -0.0184*  -0.0014 
Multi-Car Dummy  -0.0944*  -0.005  Time*Northern Plains Dummy  -0.0019*  -0.0006 
Unit-Train Dummy  -0.1046*  -0.0061  Time*Central Plains Dummy  -0.0134*  -0.0005 
Shuttle-Train Dummy  -0.5552*  -0.0234  Time*Southern Plains Dummy  -0.0132*  -0.0007 
Corn Dummy  -0.1547*  -0.0045  Time*Western Corn Belt 
Dummy 
-0.0151*  -0.0004 
Soybean Dummy  -0.2561*  -0.0064  Time*Pacific Northwest Dummy 0.0080*  -0.0009 
Time*Corn Dummy  0.0362*  -0.0011  Time*West Dummy  -0.0009  -0.0013 
Time*Soybean Dummy  0.0153*  -0.0017  Quarter 2 Dummy  0.0371*  -0.0024 
Time
2*Corn Dummy  -0.0017*  -0.00006  Quarter 3 Dummy  0.0215*  -0.0023 
Time
2* Soybean Dummy  -0.0007*  -0.00009  Quarter 4 Dummy 
   
0.0191*  -0.0024 
North East Dummy  -0.0338**  -0.014  Short Distance Movement 
Dummy 
0.3124*  -0.0049 
 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.7368 
F = 16,378; N = 239,854 
*significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; ***significant at the 10 percent level 
All continuous variables (except time) in natural logarithms 
 
                                                   
3The time effects will be discussed subsequently.  
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Of special interest in this estimation are the changes in rates over time.  Since railroad 
deregulation occurred in 1980, changes in rates since 1981 provide insight into the effects that 
deregulation has had on rates for various shipment types.  Because many variables are interacted 
with time in the estimation, the total effect of time on rate per ton-mile depends on the 
commodity shipped, the distance from the nearest water loading facility, the railroad 
concentration at the origin, and the region where the shipment originated.  
Figure 3 shows simulated corn, soybean, and wheat rates per ton-mile when placing all 
variables at their mean levels for the entire period, except for time.  The simulation shows the 
changes in rates that have occurred solely due to changes in the parameters over time.  Thus, it 
may be thought of as simulating the direct effect of deregulation.
4  As the figure shows, while the 
rates per ton-mile have come down on all three commodities, their rates have converged 
somewhat relative to one another. 
 
                                                   
4Indirect effects of deregulation on rates may also have occurred to the extent that shipment size and distance 
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As mentioned previously, the change in rates over time depends on a variety of 
competitive characteristics.  The move to deregulation brought about an entirely new philosophy 
in rate determination.  Rates-setting became more market-based.  Consequently, an increased 
importance of demand elasticity variables over time is expected.   
Regarding intermodal elasticity between rail and barge, the distance from the nearest 
barge loading facility shows an increasing importance in our estimation over time.  Longer 
distances to barge loading facilities mean less intermodal competition considering potential truck-
barge combinations.  Figure 4 simulates the rate savings since 1981 at various distances from the 
nearest water loading facility for wheat, corn, and soybeans.  As the figure shows, rate savings 
were larger in areas closer to barge facilities.  The parameter estimate of 0.0212 suggests that as 
distance to the nearest water loading facility is increased by 1 percent, the rate per ton-mile 
increases by 0.02 percent in the initial rate period of 1981.  The parameter estimate of .0018 on the 
time/barge distance interaction term suggests that a one percent increase in distance from the 
nearest water loading facility leads to a 0.055 percent increase in rate per ton-mile in 2000.  
Therefore, as expected, the influence of intermodal competition has strengthened during the 
deregulated environment. 
Conversely, the parameter estimate for the time interaction with the Herfindahl Index of 
origin railroad concentration showed decreasing importance over time.  This was not expected 
since an increased reliance on market factors in rate setting should also lead to increasing 
importance of intramodal competition.  However, one possible explanation for the decreasing 
importance of this variable over time is truck technology and their increasing ability of trucks to 
compete over longer distances.  If railroads compete over large geographic areas because of the  
ability of trucks to haul at low costs for longer distances, the concentration of railroads in a 
county may be irrelevant.  In addition, the role of rail competition may be diminished by 
increasing local market consumption, including processing, feeding, and dairy, which are often 
served by trucks. 
 
The changes in rates over time also varied among regions.  Each region has a unique story 
with regard to the commodities produced, markets served, and transport utilized, and 
consequently realize different levels of geographic and product competition.  Regions are 
characterized by differences in the availability of terminal markets, the volume and scope of 
agricultural processing, and movement characteristics.  The following sections explore some of 
the characteristics of the various regions and highlight differences in rate changes that have 
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2.  Simulated Intermodal Barge Competition Effects on Rail Rates 






It is important to understand the distribution and incidence of influences associated with 
deregulation of rail rates.  The objective of this research was to provide insight into inter- and 
intracommodity rail rate differentials observed since rates were deregulated in 1981.  A cross-
sectional/time-series analysis of U.S. corn, wheat, and soybean shipments was considered in the 
assessment of rail grain rate differentials.  County level rail shipment characteristics for two 
decades were considered in the analysis.  The time period selected, 1981 through 2000, covers 
two decades of pricing by railroads in the deregulated environment.  As expected, result suggest 
that market-based pricing has become more prevalent in later years.  The tendency for railroads to 
implement more market-based pricing in recent years implies that demand elasticity is becoming 
an increasing important factor in the relative competitiveness of U.S. grain producers. 
The overall benefit of rail deregulation, measured in terms of rail productivity and 
decreasing in rail rates for shippers, is well established in previous research and consistent with 
the findings in this research.  Important findings in research go beyond the macroeconomic 
discussion to show that these benefits are not distributed uniformly across or within 
commodities.  Furthermore, as market-based pricing has become more prevalent the variance in 
distribution of benefits is shown to increasingly favor those grain producers located in regions 
with higher levels of intermodal competition.  In a competitive market environment, trends in 
relative, as well as overall, rates should be considered in assessing the impacts of policy and 
investment initiatives.  This research will help us to better understand the ultimate consequences  
of future policy and investment decisions, in terms of overall and relative competitiveness of 
grain commodities and U.S. grain producers.    
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